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DOING THE PUBLIC A DISSERVICE: 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND 
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
ALISON M. NEWMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  When deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction or a stay 
pending appeal, courts consider, among other factors, whether 
granting the preliminary injunction or stay would disserve the public 
interest. In the context of individual-rights cases, courts often 
experience pressure to remedy the alleged constitutional harms 
immediately. However, behavioral-economic concepts demonstrate 
that such quick action can negatively affect society as a whole. 
Specifically, granting a right and then taking it away, as happens 
when a lower court grants a right and is reversed on appeal, results in 
a net loss to society. Using the recent same-sex marriage litigation, this 
analysis demonstrates that to avoid disserving the public interest, 
courts should consider the behavioral-economic effects of loss 
aversion and the endowment effect within the public-interest factor of 
the tests for preliminary relief and should attempt to maintain the 
status quo until the decisions are final. 
INTRODUCTION 
In headline-grabbing individual-rights cases, there is always a 
sense of urgency—there is an alleged unjust constitutional violation 
and it needs to be rectified immediately. Even before a judgment is 
final or the litigants have exhausted their appeals, one’s first reaction 
is to right the wrong immediately. However, the tests for both a 
preliminary injunction and a stay pending appeal require 
consideration of the public interest. Often this factor is overlooked or 
summarily discussed.  
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However, behavioral-economic concepts of loss aversion and the 
endowment effect show that the uncertainty that can follow from 
quick action can be worse for society as a whole. In deciding whether 
to grant a preliminary injunction or stay a permanent injunction 
pending appeal, courts should consider this uncertainty’s possible 
effects within the existing analytical framework and seek to maintain 
the status quo until a final decision is rendered. This concept can be 
illustrated by examining one of the major individual-rights issues in 
recent memory: same-sex marriage. 
With few exceptions,1 state and federal trial-court decisions since 
United States v. Windsor2 have struck down state provisions outlawing 
same-sex marriage as unconstitutional.3 However, courts have 
 
 1. See, e.g., Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 925 (E.D. La. 2014) (“It would no 
doubt be celebrated to be in the company of the near-unanimity of the many other federal 
courts that have spoken to this pressing issue, if this Court were confident in the belief that 
those cases provide a correct guide.”). 
 2. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 3. Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-cv-4081, 2015 WL 144567, at *11 (D.S.D. Jan. 12, 
2015); Campaign for S. Equality v. Bryant, No. 3:14-cv-818, 2014 WL 6680570, at *40–41 (S.D. 
Miss. Nov. 25, 2014); Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1236 (D. Mont. 2014); Condon v. 
Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 589 (D.S.C. 2014); Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-622-cv, 2014 WL 5810215, 
at *10 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014); McGee v. Cole, Civ. A. No. 3:13-24068, 2014 WL 5802665, at 
*10 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 7, 2014); Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-2518, 2014 W 5598128, at *22 (D. 
Kan. Nov. 4, 2014); Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-cv-200, 2014 WL 5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 
2014); Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315–16 (D. Ariz. 2014); Hamby v. Parnell, No. 
3:14-cv-89, 2014 WL 5089399, at *12 (D. Alaska Oct. 12, 2014); Gen. Synod of the United 
Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 792 (W.D.N.C. 2014), appeal filed, No. 14-2225 
(4th Cir. Nov. 10, 2014); Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev’d sub 
nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 
213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015); Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164–65 (S.D. Ind. 2014), 
aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); 
Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 
766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); 
Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431–32 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128, 1147 (D. Or. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1087 (D. Idaho 2014), 
aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2015 WL 
12817, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2015); DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 
2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 
16, 2015); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 759, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. 
Supp. 2d 632, 665–66 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 WL 683680, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub 
nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 135 
S. Ct. 286 (2014); Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292–93 (N.D. Fla. 2014); Bishop v. 
United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d sub nom. 
Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Kitchen v. 
Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2013 WL 1908815, at *13 
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fractured on their treatment of whether to stay their decisions 
pending appeal. After the Supreme Court issued a stay pending 
appeal in Herbert v. Kitchen,4 Utah’s same-sex-marriage case, most 
district courts followed suit.5 Since the Court’s denial of certiorari in 
the same-sex-marriage cases, however, that trend has reversed.6 And 
some appellate courts have stepped in when trial courts have failed to 
stay their decisions, recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage.7 
Courts have generally cited Kitchen when issuing stays in same-
sex marriage cases,8 with some even lamenting that Kitchen has forced 
their hands.9 However, behavioral-economic concepts reinforce the 
Supreme Court’s short order: according to the theories of loss 
aversion and the endowment effect,10 repeatedly disrupting the status 
quo by granting and withdrawing rights harms society regardless of 
 
(Ark. Cir. Ct. May 9, 2014); Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-cv-32572 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2014); 
Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 368–69 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law. Div. 2013); Griego v. 
Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013).  
 4. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014).  
 5. See infra notes 18–48. 
 6. See Josh Blackman, Is Herbert v. Kitchen Still Good Law?, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG 
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/10/16/is-herbert-v-kitchen-still-good-law 
(“By denying certiorari on the petition for certiorari from the 10th Circuit, the stay originally 
granted in Herbert v. Kitchen has been lifted.”). Because the Court has since denied stays 
pending appeal in same-sex-marriage cases, it would appear that Kitchen is no longer binding. 
See, e.g., Order in Pending Case, Parnell v. Hamby, 135 S. Ct. 299, 399 (2014) (denying stay); 
Order in Pending Case, Otter v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014) (denying stay). 
 7. Order, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th Cir. June 27, 2014); Order, DeBoer v. 
Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014); Order, DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. 
Mar. 22, 2014). 
 8. See Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (“In accordance with the Supreme Court’s issuance of 
a stay in Kitchen v. Herbert, and consistent with the reasoning provided in Bishop[ v. Rainey], 
this Court s[t]ays execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.”); Bishop, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (“In accordance with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in . . . [Herbert v. Kitchen], the Court stays execution of 
this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.”). In light of the denial of cert in the case, scholars have already begun questioning 
whether Herbert remains good law. See supra note 6.  
 9. See Order at 3–4, DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (White, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court’s short order in Herbert v. Kitchen “provides little 
guidance” and that the Court’s four-factor test for an injunction did not warrant a stay); Order 
at 3, Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. May 20, 2014) (Hurwitz, J., concurring) (“I concur in 
the order granting the stay pending appeal . . . solely because I believe that the Supreme Court, 
in Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014), has virtually instructed courts of appeals to grant 
stays in the circumstances before us today. If we were writing on a cleaner slate, I would 
conclude that application of the familiar factors in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), 
counsels against the stay requested by the Idaho appellants.”). 
 10. See infra Part III.B–C. 
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which outcome a given person or society as a whole prefers. This logic 
has applications beyond the same-sex-marriage realm.11 For instance, 
challengers of state abortion restrictions usually ask for preliminary 
injunctions to prevent the laws from going into effect.12 While these 
cases are litigated, such restrictions should be prevented from taking 
effect in order to maintain the prelitigation status quo until there is a 
final decision. To do otherwise ignores the practicalities of the 
situation. Behavioral-economic concepts, which some legal scholars 
argue should be taken into consideration,13 indicate that granting and 
then withdrawing a right elicits a different effect on utility than never 
having granted the right at all. These effects should be considered 
within the established test for preliminary injunctions. That 
framework need not be modified in this context, as societal utility 
losses can be measured under the public-interest prong.14 
Part I provides background on the current state of same-sex-
marriage litigation in the United States. Part II reviews the law on 
preliminary injunctions and stays pending appeal. Part III explains 
loss aversion and the endowment effect. Part IV applies that analysis 
to the same-sex-marriage cases currently working their way through 
courts across the country, showing that the repeated granting and 
withdrawal of a right works to the detriment of society as a whole 
regardless of one’s opinions on the merits. Part V discusses further 
applications of the concept, specifically in the context of abortion 
restrictions. 
 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (considering the 
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction). For purposes of this analysis, a preliminary 
injunction preventing a law from going into effect is functionally identical to a stay of a ruling 
pending appeal. Both serve to delay legal change, regardless of whether the source is legislative 
or judicial.  
 13. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of 
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1771–72 (1998) (explaining that the endowment effect and loss 
aversion undermine the central tenets of traditional law and economics); Eyal Zamir, Loss 
Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 833 (2012) (arguing that due to loss aversion the 
law should favor withholding over withdrawing a right). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991) (discussing the 
endowment effect’s potential applications to legal policy). 
 14. Cf. generally James Powers, Note, A Status Quo Bias: Behavioral Economics and the 
Federal Preliminary Injunction Standard, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1027 (2014) (arguing that courts 
should not consider status quo bias outside the current test for preliminary injunctions). 
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I.  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Same-sex marriage has grown astonishingly quickly. In 2003, 
Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex marriage,15 
and in the twelve years since, same-sex marriage has been approved 
in an unprecedented forty-five other states and the District of 
Columbia.16 
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have approved 
same-sex marriage in trial courts, although many of the court 
decisions are currently being appealed: thirty-four states did so by 
court decision (Alabama,17 Alaska,18 Arizona,19 Arkansas,20 
California,21 Colorado,22 Connecticut,23 Florida,24 Idaho,25 Indiana,26 
 
 15. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970–71 (Mass. 2003). 
 16. See infra notes 23–63. 
 17. Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328728, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015) 
(striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on due-process and equal-
protection grounds). 
 18. See Hamby v. Parnell, No. 3:14-cv-89, 2014 WL 5089399, at *12 (D. Alaska Oct. 12, 
2014) (striking down state statutes and a state constitutional amendment on due-process and 
equal-protection grounds).  
 19. See Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315–16 (D. Ariz. 2014) (striking down state 
statutes and a state constitutional amendment on equal-protection grounds). 
 20. See Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1908815, at *13 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 
May 9, 2013) (striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on right-to-
privacy and equal-protection grounds). This decision was stayed by the state supreme court 
pending appeal. Formal Order, Smith v. Wright, No. CV-14-427 (Ark. May 16, 2014). 
 21. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking 
down a state constitutional amendment on federal due-process and equal-protection grounds), 
aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 22. See Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-cv-32572, at *48 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2014) (striking 
down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-
process grounds). The trial court stayed its decision pending appeal. Id.  
 23. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476–81 (Conn. 2008) (permitting 
same-sex marriage on state constitutional equal-protection grounds).  
 24. See Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292–93 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (striking down a 
state statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process 
grounds).  
 25. See Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1087 (D. Idaho 2014) (striking down a state 
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process 
grounds), aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 
2015 WL 12817, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2015). 
 26. See Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164–65 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (striking down a 
state statute on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied sub nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). The Seventh Circuit stayed 
the district court’s decision pending appeal. Order, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th Cir. June 
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Iowa,27 Kansas,28 Kentucky,29 Massachusetts,30 Michigan,31 Mississippi,32 
Missouri,33 Montana,34 Nevada,35 New Jersey,36 New Mexico,37 North 
Carolina,38 Ohio,39 Oklahoma,40 Oregon,41 Pennsylvania,42 South 
 
27, 2014). Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, the district court’s ruling 
went into effect. See Bogan, 135 S. Ct. at 316 (denying certiorari).  
 27. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009) (permitting same-sex marriage 
on state equal-protection grounds). 
 28. Marie v. Moser, No. 14-cv-2518, 2014 WL 5598128, at *22 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2014) 
(striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection 
and due-process grounds). 
 29. See Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (striking down a state 
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process 
grounds), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014), cert. granted, 
No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015). The district court stayed its decision pending 
the state’s appeal. Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 550 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
 30. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–71 (Mass. 2003) 
(permitting same-sex marriage on state equal-protection grounds). 
 31. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (striking down a 
state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), rev’d, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015). The 
Sixth Circuit stayed the district court’s decision pending appeal. Order, DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 
14-1341 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2014). 
 32. Campaign for S. Equality v. Bryant, No. 3:14-cv-818, 2014 WL 6680570, at *40–41 (S.D. 
Miss. Nov. 25, 2014) (striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on 
federal equal-protection and due-process grounds). The district court’s decision was stayed by 
the Fifth Circuit pending appeal. Campaign for S. Equality v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
 33. Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-622-cv, 2014 WL 5810215, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014) 
(striking down a state statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection 
and due-process grounds). 
 34. Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1236 (D. Mont. 2014) (striking down a state 
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection grounds). 
 35. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476–77 (9th Cir. 2014) (striking down state statutes and 
constitutional amendments on federal equal-protection grounds), rev’g Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 
F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012).  
 36. See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 368–69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 
21, 2013) (permitting same-sex marriage on federal equal-protection grounds). 
 37. See Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013) (permitting same-sex marriage on 
state equal-protection grounds). 
 38. See Gen. Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 792 
(W.D.N.C. 2014) (striking down state statutes on due-process and equal-protection grounds), 
appeal filed, No. 14-2225 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2014). 
 39. Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1061 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (striking down a state 
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process 
grounds), rev’d, DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 
WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015). 
 40. See Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1297 (N.D. Okla. 
2014) (striking down a state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-
process grounds), aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
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Carolina,43 South Dakota,44 Tennessee,45 Texas,46 Utah,47 Virginia,48 
West Virginia,49 Wisconsin,50 and Wyoming51); eight states and the 
District of Columbia52 did so by legislation (Delaware,53 Hawaii,54 
 
135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). The Tenth Circuit stayed its decision pending the state’s petition for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. Because the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in the case, the ruling went into effect. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 271, 271 (2014).  
 41. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1147 (D. Or. 2014) (striking down a state 
statute and state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process 
grounds). 
 42. See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431–32 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (striking down a 
state statute on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds). 
 43. Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 589 (D.S.C. 2014) (striking down a state statute 
and constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds). 
 44. Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-cv-4081, 2015 WL 144567, at *11 (D.S.D. Jan. 12, 
2015) (striking down a state statute and constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection 
and due-process grounds). 
 45. See Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 771–72 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (granting a 
preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of a state constitutional amendment and 
state statute against the plaintiffs on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), rev’d, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015). The 
district court’s ruling applies only to the six plaintiffs in the case. Id. at 772. 
 46. See De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 665–66 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (striking down a 
state constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds). The 
district court stayed its decision pending the state’s appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 665. 
 47. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013) (permitting same-
sex marriage on federal equal-protection grounds), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). The Supreme Court stayed the district court’s decision pending the 
state’s appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Order in Pending Case, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 
893 (2014). Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, the ruling will go into 
effect. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. at 265. 
 48. See Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483–84 (E.D. Va. 2014) (striking down a state 
constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), aff’d sub nom. 
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. 
Ct. 286 (2014). The district court stayed its decision pending the state’s appeal to the Fourth 
Circuit. Id. at 484. The Supreme Court then stayed the Fourth Circuit’s decision pending the 
state’s petition for certiorari. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 32, 32 (2014). Because the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in the case, the ruling will go into effect. Rainey, 135 S. Ct. at 286.  
 49. McGee v. Cole, Civ. A. No. 3:13-24068, 2014 WL 5802665, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 7, 
2014) (striking down a state statute on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds). 
 50. See Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (striking down a state 
constitutional amendment on federal equal-protection and due-process grounds), aff’d sub nom. 
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 
316 (2014). The district court stayed its decision pending the state’s appeal to the Seventh 
Circuit. Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64, 2014 WL 2693963, at *7 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2014). 
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, the ruling will go into effect. Walker, 
135 S. Ct. at 316. 
 51. Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-cv-200, 2014 WL 5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014) 
(striking down a state statute based on federal equal-protection grounds). 
 52. D.C. CODE § 46-401 (Supp. 2014). 
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Illinois,55 Minnesota,56 New Hampshire,57 New York,58 Rhode Island,59 
and Vermont60); and three did so by popular vote (Maine,61 
Maryland,62 and Washington63). More than half of the American 
population now lives in a state in which same-sex marriage is legal.64 
II.  THE LAW ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND 
STAYS PENDING APPEAL 
To receive a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy four 
factors: “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 
public interest.”65 Lower courts disagree on whether these factors 
 
 53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 129 (West Supp. 2012).  
 54. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (West 2014). 
 55. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/10 (West Supp. 2014). 
 56. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West Supp. 2014). 
 57. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 58. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014). 
 59. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (2013). 
 60. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010). 
 61. See BUREAU OF CORPS., ELECTIONS, & COMM’NS, NOVEMBER 6, 2012, REFERENDUM 
ELECTION TABULATIONS: COUNTY AND STATEWIDE TOTALS (2012), available at 
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2012/tab-ref-2012.html (approving same-sex marriage with 
52.7 percent of the vote).  
 62. See STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2012 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 
(2012), available at http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/results/general/gen_qresults_
2012_4_00_1.html (approving same-sex marriage with 52.4 percent of the vote). 
 63. See WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER 06, 2012 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 
(2012), available at http://vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Referendum-Measure-No-74-Concerns-
marriage-for-same-sex-couples.html (approving same-sex marriage with 53.7 percent of the 
vote). 
 64. Nate Silver & Allison McCann, Same-Sex Marriage Is Now Legal for a Majority of the 
U.S., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 6, 2014, 12:27 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/same-sex-
marriage-is-now-legal-for-a-majority-of-the-u-s. Because some federal appellate decisions 
striking down bans on same-sex marriage apply to other states’ prohibitions, this number is 
expected to rise. For example, the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 
(10th Cir. 2014), applies to similar laws in Wyoming and Colorado, which as of the denial of 
certiorari had not allowed same-sex marriage. See Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-cv-200, 2014 WL 
5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014) (granting a preliminary injunction under Herbert and 
Bishop). With those additional states taken into account, this number should increase to 
approximately 60 percent. Silver & McCann, supra. 
 65. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Although the tests for 
granting a preliminary injunction and staying an injunction are similar, “the differences in 
posture mean that the two tests are not identical.” 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
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should be considered on a sliding scale, in which some factors can be 
weaker provided that others are sufficiently strong, or considered 
strictly, requiring that each of the four factors be found by a 
preponderance of the evidence.66 Currently, only the Fourth Circuit 
uses the strict reading.67 
The circuit split over the reading of the test for a preliminary 
injunction stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council,68 in which the Court considered 
whether to grant an injunction prohibiting the Navy from performing 
training exercises until after an environmental study had been 
completed.69 The Court stated that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary 
injunction must establish” the four factors.70 The Fourth Circuit has 
interpreted this mandatory language to mean that each individual 
factor must be established by a preponderance, not that the factors 
must collectively be balanced.71 Winter overturned the Ninth Circuit’s 
rather extreme sliding-scale approach, which had permitted the grant 
of a preliminary injunction with only a possibility of irreparable harm 
as long as there was a strong likelihood of success on the merits.72 
Other circuits have concluded that a different formulation of the 
sliding scale is still permissible under Winter.73 
 
PROCEDURE § 3954 (4th ed. 2008). Because the common element of the public interest is the 
main focus of this analysis, the two tests can be considered together.  
 66. See Rachel A. Weisshaar, Note, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split over 
Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1032–48 (2012) (reviewing the current circuit 
split). 
 67. See Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.2d 307, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[I]n light of Winter, this 
Court recalibrated that test, requiring that each preliminary injunction factor be ‘satisfied as 
articulated.’” (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 
2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff’d The Real 
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam))); The Real Truth 
About Obama, Inc., 575 F.3d at 347 (replacing the balance-of-hardship test in light of Winter). 
 68. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
 69. Id. at 12. 
 70. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).  
 71. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.2d 307, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 72. Winter, 555 U.S. at 21 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s holding “that when a plaintiff 
demonstrates a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be 
entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm” (citations omitted)). 
 73. See, e.g., Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that “some version of the sliding scale test” could survive Winter); Hoosier Energy 
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (“How 
strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance of harms: the more net harm an 
injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still 
supporting some preliminary relief.” (citations omitted)).  
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To grant a stay of an injunction pending appeal, a court must find 
that four factors balance in the proponent’s favor: (1) he is likely to 
succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm 
without the stay, (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage the 
stay may cause the other party, and (4) the stay will not disserve the 
public interest.74 According to most circuits, “A high probability of 
success on the merits is not always required; the greater the harm 
worked by the judgment the lower the required showing of probable 
success.”75 Although these elements closely resemble the test for 
issuing a permanent injunction, the two are not identical.76 
The likelihood of irreparable injury can be conceptualized in two 
ways. First, it could be the same overall likelihood of irreparable 
injury used in deciding whether to issue an injunction. Alternatively, 
it could be the likelihood of irreparable injury due to the delay that a 
stay would cause. In individual-rights cases, this distinction is unlikely 
to matter: when an individual constitutional right is infringed, the 
injury is irreparable and happens continuously.77 The balance of 
hardships could similarly be framed as either the overall balance or 
the balance attributable only to the stay. Again, the distinction will 
likely not matter: since it is an individual constitutional violation, the 
balance of hardships is not especially relevant because plaintiffs suffer 
a continuous violation of their rights. In individual-rights cases, the 
public-interest factor is arguably the most important.78 
Because the factors considered in granting a stay are nearly 
identical to those considered in granting an injunction, the decisions 
under the two tests often line up. In considering whether to grant a 
permanent injunction, the public interest is not always especially 
 
 74. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 3954 (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 
(1987)). 
 75. Id. at n.28. 
 76. Id. The test for issuing a permanent injunction is that (1) the plaintiff has suffered an 
irreparable injury, (2) remedies at law are inadequate, (3) the balance of hardships weighs in the 
plaintiff’s favor, and (4) an injunction would not disserve the public interest. eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 77. See Beatrice Catherine Franklin, Note, Irreparability, I Presume? On Assuming 
Irreparable Harm for Constitutional Violations in Preliminary Injunctions, 45 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. REV. 623, 634–45 (2014) (describing the circuit split over whether courts presume 
irreparable harm for constitutional violations). 
 78. In other circumstances, courts have noted that “the public interest is a factor to be 
strongly considered.” Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983). Lopez considered 
the restoration of disability benefits to Social Security recipients, id. at 1433–34, but the same 
logic would apply to violations of individual constitutional rights, given their likely societal 
effects. 
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important; the focus is instead on the likelihood of success and 
irreparable harm. The Supreme Court has stated that in evaluating a 
request for a stay, the “most critical” factors are the appellant’s 
likelihood of success on the merits and whether he would suffer 
irreparable harm if the stay were not granted.79 However, under 
Winter, a court still “must” consider all four factors.80 
In contrast, in deciding whether to grant a stay or a preliminary 
injunction, different considerations are important than in deciding 
whether to grant permanent injunctions: by their nature, the former 
decisions are temporary and subject to change in the near future. The 
public-interest prong is not the same for preliminary and permanent 
relief, including the decision to stay—that prong directs courts to 
consider whether there are “policy considerations that bear on 
whether the order should issue.”81 Therefore, if a temporary stay or 
preliminary injunction could have some effect on the public that a 
permanent injunction would not, the court’s decision could change. 
Under the Fourth Circuit’s strict approach, the probability of a 
preliminary injunction not disserving the public interest could drop 
below a preponderance, and the injunction would not be granted. 
Under the balancing test, however, the balance could shift away from 
granting a preliminary injunction or denying its stay. 
Three circuits have recognized that temporary relief could harm 
society because it changes the legal landscape without a final 
judgment. The Tenth Circuit applies a heightened standard for 
granting preliminary relief when that relief would change the status 
quo.82 The Second and Ninth Circuits impose a heightened burden for 
mandatory as opposed to prohibitory injunctions and define 
mandatory injunctions as those that change the status quo.83 In each 
 
 79. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).  
 80. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 81. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 2948.4. 
 82. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(“[Injunctions that disturb the status quo] are disfavored and they require that the movant 
satisfy an even heavier burden of showing that the four factors listed above weigh heavily and 
compellingly in movant’s favor before such an injunction may be issued.”), overruled on other 
grounds, O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (en banc).  
 83. See Sunward Elecs., Inc v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying a 
heightened standard when the “injunction sought is mandatory—i.e., it will alter, rather than 
maintain, the status quo”); Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting 
that mandatory injunctions, which alter the status quo, are “particularly disfavored” (quoting 
Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979))). 
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of these situations, the effect of a temporary change is considered as 
something separate from the existing four-factor test for preliminary 
relief.84 All three circuits distinguish between temporary and 
permanent relief, which the current test for whether to grant a stay 
does not explicitly account for. However, when combined with 
developments in the realm of behavioral economics and its better 
understanding of seemingly irrational behavior, these considerations 
of the societal effects fit neatly within the final prong of the 
preliminary-relief tests. 
III.  THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT AND LOSS AVERSION 
Behavioral-economic principles help explain why the temporary 
nature of preliminary injunctions can disserve the public interest even 
when a permanent injunction would not. According to the theories of 
loss aversion and the endowment effect, people value rights more 
highly once they possess them; changing the status quo through 
preliminary injunctions and later restoring it would therefore disserve 
the public interest. It is easy to argue that if a person did not possess a 
right in the first place, nothing is lost by reverting to the initial state of 
affairs. That argument is an oversimplification—behavioral-economic 
research shows that people value rights more highly once they 
actually possess them and that they feel losses more strongly than 
gains.85 Therefore, giving someone a right and then taking it away 
results in a net loss to his utility. 
A. The Coase Theorem 
The starting point for any analysis of the efficient allocation of 
rights is the Coase Theorem, which derives from Professor Ronald H. 
Coase’s 1960 paper, “The Problem of Social Cost.”86 The Coase 
Theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs, the initial 
allocation of property rights does not matter, as people will be able to 
bargain around that allocation and will always reach the efficient 
 
 84. For a criticism of this approach, see generally Powers, supra note 14. 
 85. Although the economic literature typically focuses on tangible goods, this effect has 
been shown to apply to legal rights. See JUDD HAMMACH & GARDNER M. BROWN, JR., 
WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS: TOWARDS BIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1974) (finding that 
duck hunters would pay an average of $247 to obtain the right to keep a particular area of 
wetlands undeveloped, but if they already possessed that right, they would demand an average 
of $1044 to sell it). 
 86. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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result.87 However, when there are transaction costs, as there typically 
are in real-world situations, those costs can be prohibitively high, and 
the initial allocation of property rights will change the final 
allocation.88 
The theorem has been applied outside of the realm of tangible 
property. For instance, introductory microeconomics students often 
analyze a simple problem: A and B are roommates; A is a smoker, B 
is not.89 B values having a smoke-free apartment at $100, while A 
values his right to smoke at $90. A currently possesses a “right to 
smoke.” If B does not want him to smoke, he will have to pay A a 
certain amount of money to keep him from smoking. Because B 
values his right to a smoke-free apartment more highly than A values 
the right to smoke in the apartment, there is some amount of money 
(between $90 and $100) that B can pay A to keep him from smoking. 
If B pays A $90, A is in the same position he was in—he can no longer 
smoke in the apartment, but he has $90 to offset his $90 loss. B is $10 
better off—he paid $90 to gain a $100 benefit. In this limited world, 
societal value has increased by $10. 
Now suppose that B possesses the right to a smoke-free 
apartment. Here, no transaction would take place because the most A 
would be willing to pay to be able to smoke is $90, the value he places 
on the right. B would not accept less than $100 to give up the right. In 
the absence of transaction costs or other barriers to bargaining, the 
same efficient allocation of property rights would be reached 
regardless of the initial allocation. 
The presence of transaction costs can cause inertia, with parties 
maintaining the initial allocation even when it is not the most 
efficient.90 In the same-sex-marriage context, supporters of traditional 
marriage were initially allocated a legal right. While they continue to 
possess the right, the above analysis would suggest either that 
traditional marriage is efficient or, more likely, that transaction costs 
 
 87. Id. at 2–7. 
 88. Id. at 15–17. 
 89. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 648–50 (8th ed. 2010) (discussing this problem). This problem is also often framed 
as one roommate who wishes to play loud music while the other prefers silence.  
 90. Imagine, for instance, that it would cost $15 to create a contract between the two. If A 
were initially allocated the right, B would need to pay him $90 for the right plus the $15 
transaction cost. The $105 cost would exceed what B would be willing to pay, and the right 
would remain with A. Note that this is an inefficient outcome—society as a whole gains if B 
possesses the right. 
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in the form of political barriers are too high to move from the initial 
allocation. 
B. The Endowment Effect 
The simple proposition embodied in the Coase Theorem—that 
in the absence of transaction costs scarce resources will be allocated 
to those who value them most—does not seem to accurately reflect 
behavior. The “endowment effect,” a term coined by Professor 
Richard Thaler in 1980,91 better reflects reality. In its simplest form, it 
describes the hypothesis that people assign a higher value to things 
based merely on the fact that they own them, challenging the 
assumption of the rational-economic actor. The endowment effect 
suggests that, contrary to the Coase Theorem, the initial endowment 
can matter even absent transaction costs: the initial allocation of a 
legal entitlement will affect trading and bargaining because the 
possessor of the right will value it more.92 Therefore, the entitlement 
should be initially allocated to the person who values it more highly. 
Otherwise, the individual who owns the entitlement may be unwilling 
to trade it even if that would lead to the efficient outcome. Using the 
above roommate example, assume that the objective value of A’s 
right to smoke—the amount he would be willing to pay B for the 
right—is $90, and that B is willing to pay $100 to buy that right from 
A. However, because of the endowment effect, if A were initially 
allocated the right, his subjective valuation of the right, and therefore 
the payment he would require to give it up, would be higher. If that 
valuation exceeded $100, no trade with B would take place because B 
would not pay more than $100 for the right to a smoke-free 
apartment. 
“[T]he main effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of 
the good one owns, only the pain of giving it up.”93 This distinction 
arises because people view opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs 
differently. An opportunity cost is the value of the best option 
forgone when a choice has to be made between mutually exclusive 
alternatives. Out-of-pocket costs refer to the costs incurred by losing 
something in one’s possession. Though rational economics would 
 
 91. Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 39, 44 (1980). 
 92. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1997). 
 93. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197 (1991).  
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dictate that opportunity costs be perceived as equivalent to out-of-
pocket costs by a rational actor, experiments have shown that not to 
be the case.94 People view out-of-pocket costs as losses and 
opportunity costs as forgone gains.95 Therefore, out-of-pocket costs, 
potential losses, are more heavily weighted because people are 
typically loss-averse.96 
The endowment effect has been noted as being somewhat 
intuitive.97 For example, even before serious experimental evidence of 
the effect existed, companies were using it to their advantage. When 
faced with charges levied on credit-card transactions, credit-card 
company representatives argued for those extra charges to be framed 
as discounts for using cash instead of charges for using credit cards.98 
If customers view not receiving the cash discount as an opportunity 
cost of using the card but view a surcharge as an out-of-pocket 
charge, this distinction makes sense.99 The discount is a potentially 
 
 94. See infra notes 100–09 and accompanying text. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1729, 1737 (1998) (“[T]he greatest force of the endowment effect in legal analysis may be 
to bolster the law’s insight that aspirations are not the same as ownership . . . .”). Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. similarly observed that it is in a person’s nature to value something he owns more 
highly than something he hopes for. See id. (citing Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (“It is the nature of a man’s mind. A thing which you have 
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in 
your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend 
yourself, however you came by it.”)). Additionally, scholars have connected the endowment 
effect to emotional rather than cognitive factors, offering four potential emotional explanations 
for the endowment effect. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, 33–35 (2007). The first is pure loss aversion, in which losing something “simply hurts 
more” than not having it at all. Id. at 34 (quoting Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and 
Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1251–52 (2003)). This explanation is based on an 
illogical bias—losing something and not gaining it at all register differently emotionally. Id. The 
second is attachment, in which the endowment effect stems from the simple fact that owning 
something adds sentimental or other value that is more than the thing’s objective value as a 
commodity. Id. The third is regret avoidance, in which giving up a right is more likely to cause 
regret in the future than is never having possessed it. Id. The fourth is the disutility of selling, in 
which the endowment effect is caused by an aversion to participating in a sale, particularly if the 
sale involves commodifying a right that the seller does not believe can be appropriately 
commodified. Id.  
 98. See FCBA Two-Tier Pricing and Procedures for Federal Reserve Board Regulation 
Writing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Hous. 
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 4 (1975) (statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System) (“Critics argued that a surcharge carries the connotation of a 
penalty on credit card users while a discount is viewed as a bonus to cash customers.”). 
 99. Thaler, supra note 91, at 45. 
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forgone gain, while the surcharge is seen as a loss. The framing, of 
course, has absolutely no effect on consumers’ bottom line—either 
way they have paid the fee. Depending on the phrasing, however, 
consumers will view the charge as either a loss or a forgone gain. 
The classic example of the endowment effect arises from a series 
of experiments performed by Professors Daniel Kahneman, Jack 
Knetsch, and Richard Thaler.100 Half of the subjects were given coffee 
mugs worth six dollars.101 These mugs were arbitrarily distributed to 
every other participant.102 The participants were then told to bargain 
over the mugs.103 In the absence of any endowment effect, economic 
theory would dictate that half of the mugs would be traded from 
those who valued them less to those who valued them more.104 
However, very few of the mugs were actually traded because the 
median seller demanded $5.25 to trade, while the median buyer was 
willing to pay only $2.25 to $2.75 to acquire a mug.105 Those who 
possessed the mugs valued them approximately twice as highly as 
those who did not.106 Notably, this effect was evident even though the 
participants possessed the mugs for a very short period before 
bargaining began.107 The authors concluded that each owner of a mug 
valued it more highly for no other reason than that he owned it.108 
Additionally, the short time period between participants’ receipt of 
the mugs and the opportunity to trade suggests the existence of an 
“instant endowment effect,” by which a person’s subjective value of 
an item increases substantially as soon as he is given the object.109 
C. Loss Aversion 
One explanation for the endowment effect is loss aversion, which 
refers to the economic observation that the loss of something an 
 
 100. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1325 (1990). 
 101. Id. at 1330. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1328. 
 105. Id. at 1332. 
 106. Id. at 1343–44. 
 107. Id. at 1342. It has since been shown that the endowment effect is stronger the longer a 
person possesses an item. Arlen, supra note 13, at 1771 n.19 (citing Michael A. Strahilevitz & 
George Loewenstein, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 276, 285 (1998)). 
 108. Kahneman et al., supra note 100, at 1342. 
 109. Id. 
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individual owns has more of a negative effect than gaining it has a 
positive effect.110 Loss aversion and the endowment effect can be 
illustrated through a simple example offered by Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler.111 In their example, an economist friend of the authors 
had purchased wine that appreciated to two hundred dollars from ten 
dollars at the time of purchase.112 The economist would drink some of 
the wine but was “neither . . . willing to sell the wine at the [current] 
price nor buy an additional bottle at that price.”113 This example 
demonstrates that people demand a much higher price to give up an 
object they own than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.114 This 
behavior cannot be explained by rational-economic principles unless 
there is some other effect at work. 
Although people are ordinarily risk-averse, they have been 
shown to be risk-seeking in choices between losses, irrationally 
choosing a gamble over a sure value when the gamble has an equal or 
lesser expected value. In an experiment conducted by Professors 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, subjects were offered a choice 
between a sure loss of 3000 and an 80 percent chance of losing 4000.115 
Under rational economics, each subject would be expected to 
consider the expected value of each choice and select the option with 
the higher expected value.116 The expected value of a loss of 3000 is –
3000. The expected value of the gamble is –3200.117 Therefore, the 
value of the sure loss, –3000, is greater than the expected value of the 
gamble, –3200, so the subject would be expected to prefer the sure 
loss. The majority of subjects nonetheless preferred the gamble, 
demonstrating risk-seeking behavior in choices between negative 
options.118 
In choices between gains, in contrast, people are risk-averse, 
preferring a sure gain to a gamble with the same or an even higher 
 
 110. Id. at 1342–46.  
 111. Kahneman et al., supra note 93. 
 112. Id. at 194. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 266 (1979). 
 116. The expected value is the sum of all possible outcomes weighted by their probabilities.  
 117. The expected value is the probability of the loss, 0.8, times the expected loss, 4000, 
added to the probability of no loss, 0.2, times zero. Thus, EV = (0.8)(4000) + (0.2)(0) = –3200. 
 118. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 115, at 268. 
NEWMAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/26/2015  12:51 AM 
1190 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1173 
expected value.119 A risk-averse person will choose a sure gain of 3000 
over an 80 percent chance of receiving 3750 even though the expected 
value of the gamble is also 3000 and a rational actor would be 
indifferent between the options. Using the same numbers as above, a 
person who is sufficiently risk-averse will choose a sure gain of 3000 
over a gamble with an expected value of 3200 even though the gamble 
has a higher expected value than the sure gain. 
Loss aversion describes this phenomenon—the risk-seeking 
behavior of choosing a gamble that has a larger expected loss over a 
smaller but sure loss indicates, with the latter option, the fact that a 
person has no chance of avoiding the loss is affecting his judgment. In 
other words, the negative effect of that choice on a person’s utility is 
enhanced because there is no way that he can avoid the loss. 
Additionally, loss aversion means that a person’s reaction to an 
event depends on whether he views it as a loss or a gain. “[W]hether 
an event ‘codes’ as a loss or a gain depends not on simple facts but on 
a range of contextual factors, including how the event is framed.”120 
For example, the status quo is typically the reference point for gains 
and losses, “but it is possible to manipulate the frame so as to make a 
change ‘code’ as a loss rather than a gain, or vice versa.”121 Consider 
the credit-card example from above.122 The credit-card companies 
were advocating that the charge for using a credit card be framed as a 
discount for using cash rather than as a fee for using the card. 
Regardless of how the charge is framed, the final result is the same: 
people who pay with credit cards pay more than those who pay with 
cash. A cash discount does not feel like a loss to credit-card users; it is 
instead perceived as a forgone gain. If, however, the payment were 
framed as a charge for using a card, the consumer would view it as a 






 119. Id. at 269. 
 120. Sunstein, supra note 92, at 1180. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
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Loss aversion manifests itself graphically123 as the value function 
in Figure 1.124 The objective value of the change in the individual’s 
stock of goods and services, including his legal rights, is shown on the 
x-axis, and the subjective value to the individual is shown on the y-
axis. If people were entirely rational, the two tails of the graph would 
mirror each other: a loss or gain of some objective value would result 
in a subjectively valued loss or gain of the same magnitude. From an 
initial starting point at the origin, the reference point, a gain of 
magnitude x increases the subjective value to the person by A. From 
the same reference point, a loss of magnitude x will decrease the 
value by B > A.125 The magnitude of B is greater than the magnitude 
of A because a certain amount gained has less of a positive effect than 
that same amount lost has a negative effect. This relationship is 
shown in Figure 1 as the difference in slope over the course of the 
value function. For a change of x from the reference point, a loss has 
 
 123. The graphs merely serve to illustrate the concepts discussed and do not reflect specific 
empirical data.  
 124. Scholars have offered multiple justifications for the endowment effect. See, e.g., W. 
Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 
81 AM. ECON. REV. 635, 645–46 (1991) (offering a neoclassical account of the effect); Carey K. 
Morewedge, Lisa L. Shu, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Bad Riddance or Good 
Rubbish? Ownership and Not Loss Aversion Causes the Endowment Effect, 45 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 947, 950 (2009) (offering an attachment explanation). 
 125. See Thaler, supra note 91, at 41–43 (deriving the value function). 
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a larger effect on subjective value than a gain. Therefore, the slope of 
the “losses” tail of the value function in the bottom left quadrant is 
steeper than the slope of the “gains” tail. 
IV.  BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE DECISION TO STAY SAME-
SEX-MARRIAGE RULINGS 
When a right is granted and then withdrawn, the endowment 
effect and loss aversion are implicated.126 These behavioral-economic 
effects demonstrate that, regardless of where society stands on a 
particular issue, courts’ flip-flopping on whether a right exists is 
detrimental to both sides. Courts should consider this foreseeable 
harm to the public interest when deciding whether to grant a 
preliminary injunction or stay a decision in individual-rights cases. 
When plaintiffs sue to enjoin the government from enforcing 
laws that allegedly infringe their constitutional rights, district courts 
should consider the effect of disturbing the status quo before a final 
decision is rendered. This would prevent courts from causing societal 
utility losses through their reversals and would prevent the 
uncertainty that accompanies those reversals. In individual-rights 
cases, such as those involving same-sex marriage, plaintiffs generally 
sue for an injunction barring the government from enforcing the 
challenged constitutional provision or statute, or request a 
preliminary injunction preventing it from going into effect while the 
suit progresses. Importantly for courts, the timing of an injunction 
affects social utility. In these contentious cases, appeals are nearly 
inevitable and both sides are often willing to take the case to the 
highest authority they can, certainly to the court of appeals and, most 
likely, a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.127 Therefore, the 
likelihood of the district courts having the last word on the issue is 
virtually nil.128 In other words, uncertainty and change are essentially 
 
 126. While one can—and proponents of California’s Proposition 8 did—argue that 
withdrawing the name is not withdrawing anything of value, courts have repeatedly held that 
the name “marriage” means something. See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“We need consider only the many ways in which we encounter the word ‘marriage’ in our 
daily lives and understand it, consciously or not, to convey a sense of significance.”), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  
 127. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. 
Ct. 506, 509 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he underlying legal question . . . is a difficult 
question. It is a question, I believe, that at least four Members of this Court will wish to consider 
irrespective of the Fifth Circuit’s ultimate decision.”). 
 128. The Court has not issued a stay in cases in which the state has declined to defend its 
same-sex-marriage ban, see, e.g., Order in Pending Case, Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Geiger, 134 
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inevitable in individual-rights litigation, a reality of which the courts 
are well aware.129 
In Kitchen v. Herbert,130 a federal district court in Utah held that 
the state’s constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage 
violated the federal Constitution.131 Hours later, same-sex marriages 
began to be performed in Utah.132 The state’s requests for a stay from 
the district court133 and the Tenth Circuit134 were both denied. The 
state then filed an application in the Supreme Court to stay the 
district court’s judgment pending appeal to the Tenth Circuit.135 The 
application was referred to the full Court and granted without 
explanation.136 Same-sex marriage was legal in Utah for nineteen days, 
and over 1300 marriage licenses were issued to same-sex couples.137 It 
is unclear how many of those couples performed their marriage 
ceremonies before the stay, but “news reports put the number at over 
1000.”138 The state subsequently declared that it will not recognize 
 
S. Ct. 2722, 2722 (2014) (denying stay); Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Or. 
Att’y Gen. Ellen Rosenblum on the Subject of Pending Litigation Challenging Same-Sex 
Marriage Ban (Feb. 20, 2014), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/Pages/2014/
rel022014.aspx (“[T]he Oregon Department of Justice will not defend the prohibition in our 
state’s constitution against marriages between people of the same sex.”), presumably because 
under Hollingsworth, no one would have standing to do so, see Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 
(holding that private parties did not have standing to take over the defense of a same-sex-
marriage ban from the state). 
 129. See, e.g., Brinkman v. Long, No. 13-cv-32572, at *48 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2014) 
(“[T]he Court finds that a stay is necessary to avoid the instability and uncertainty which would 
result in the state of Colorado if the Court did not stay its ruling and for the orderly 
administration of justice.” (footnote omitted)). 
 130. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). 
 131. Id. at 1216. 
 132. Erik Eckholm, Federal Judge Rules that Same-Sex Marriage Is Legal in Utah, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2013, at A11. 
 133. Order on Motion To Stay at *1, Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6834634 
(D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013). 
 134. Order Denying Emergency Motion for Stay and Temporary Motion for Stay at *2, 
Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874 (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 2013). 
 135. Application to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal, Herbert v. Kitchen, No. 13A687 (U.S. 
Dec. 31, 2013). 
 136. Order in Pending Case, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014). The order 
appears to have been supported by every member of the Court, as it was not accompanied by 
any dissents. Lyle Denniston, Court Stops Utah Gay Marriages, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 6, 2014, 
10:34 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/court-stops-utah-gay-marriages.  
 137. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1197 (D. Utah 2014).  
 138. Id.; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Halts Same-Sex Marriages in Utah Pending Appeal, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-
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same-sex marriages performed before the stay,139 and the legal status 
of those licenses issued after the stay is unclear.140 Couples married in 
Utah before the stay were granted a preliminary injunction against 
the state requiring that Utah recognize their marriages as legally 
valid.141 
The Supreme Court stayed the district court’s decision142 until it 
denied certiorari in the case.143 This uncertainty over the legal status 
of marriages performed before the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay 
existed solely because the district court did not stay its decision and 
the Supreme Court’s stay did not occur immediately. Had the stay 
been immediate, no marriages would have been performed, and the 
failure to issue a stay would not have caused further litigation. 
Examining the societal effects of the district court’s decision under 
both rational- and behavioral-economic frameworks demonstrates 
that courts can avoid societal loss by considering loss aversion and the 




 139. See Press Release, Utah Office of the Att’y Gen., Utah Att’y Gen. Sean D. Reyes 
Official Statement (Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/2014/01/08/utah-
attorney-general-sean-d-reyes-official-statement (“We are unable to reach a legal conclusion as 
to the ultimate validity of marriage between persons of the same sex who completed their 
marriage ceremony in Utah between Dec [sic] 20, 2013 and Jan. 6, 2014. That question remains 
unanswered and the answer will depend on the result of the appeal process.”).  
 140. See Jacob Gershman, So What Happens to the Same-Sex Marriage Licenses Issued in 
Utah?, WALL ST. J. LAWBLOG (Jan. 6, 2014, 2:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/06/so-
what-happens-to-the-same-sex-marriage-licenses-issued-in-utah (describing the similar 
circumstances in California and New Mexico and noting that “[w]hen similar situations have 
come up in other states, gay couples have remained legally married even when other gay 
couples were prevented from joining them”). Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Herbert, it seems that Utah must honor those marriages. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265, 265 
(2014). 
 141. Evans, 2014 WL 2048343, at *21. In Colorado, the courts took a slightly different 
approach when the clerk for Boulder County continued to issue same-sex marriage licenses 
even when under a court order to stop. The court allowed the clerk to continue to issue the 
licenses but ordered the clerk to “provide reasonable notice to prospective and past recipients 
of same-sex marriage licenses that the validity of their marriages is dependent upon whether a 
court would find that [the clerk] had authority to allow same-sex marriages.” Colorado v. Hall, 
No. 2014-cv-30833, at *23 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2014), aff’d, No. 2014-CA-1368 (Colo. App. 
July 24, 2011), cert. granted, No. 2014-SC-582 (Colo. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2014). The Colorado 
Supreme Court granted a stay when it granted certiorari in the case. Colorado v. Hall, No. 2014-
SC-582 (Colo. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2014). 
 142. Herbert v. Evans, 135 S. Ct. 16, 16 (2014). 
 143. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265, 265 (2014). 
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A. Rational Economics and the Decision to Stay 
1. The Effect on Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage.  Under 
rational economics, withholding a right, granting that right, and then 
withdrawing it would make no difference in terms of utility—it is the 
final state of affairs that matters. Figure 2 shows a standard utility 
function, U(x),144 in which x represents an individual’s stock of goods 
and services, including his legal rights. If an individual’s initial utility 
level is A, withholding the right to same-sex marriage would keep him 
at utility level A. If the state instead permitted same-sex marriage, 
that individual’s utility would increase by B to C. If the state then 
withdrew the right, his utility would decrease from C by B and fall 
back to A. Therefore, under rational economics, these shifts would 
have no overall effect on utility. 
2. The Effect on Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage.  The situation 
for opponents of same-sex marriage is the opposite. A judicial 




 144. For a description and derivation of a standard utility curve, see VARIAN, supra note 89, 
at 54–67, 226–29. 
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Figure 4: The Effect of the District Court’s Ruling in Favor of Same-













stock of “goods” in Figure 3 to fall by F, the objective value of the 
right, causing the opponent’s utility to fall from E to G. Staying the 
decision would cause utility to increase back to E. A final decision 
permitting same-sex marriage would cause utility to fall back to G. 
B. Behavioral Economics and the Decision to Stay 
1. The Effect on Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage.  On the other 
hand, accounting for the endowment effect and loss aversion changes 
the utility analysis on both sides of the issue. In Figure 4, if initial  
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utility is A, withholding the right to same-sex marriage would keep 
utility at A because it is the loss of a potential gain, an opportunity 
cost.145 Once same-sex marriages were permitted, one would expect an 
increase in “goods” by B to cause utility to increase to C as it does 
under rational-economic analysis.146 However, the endowment effect 
suggests that once a person possesses a right like same-sex marriage, 
he will value it more than rational economics would suggest.147 If in 
value terms, the right to same-sex marriage is worth B, Figure 5 shows 
that the gain would be worth B’ > B to that person. Thus, although a 
right may be worth only B when measured objectively, once someone 
possesses that right the endowment effect dictates that he will value it 
at B’.148 As Figure 5 shows, an increase in the value of goods to B’ 
increases utility to C’ > C, the person’s utility without consideration 
of the endowment effect. 
 
 145. See Figure 2. There is, of course, a strong argument that withholding the right to same-
sex marriage can make someone feel like an outcast in society, decreasing his utility because he 
no longer feels like an equal member of society. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 
Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715, 738–39 (2000) (discussing the effects on an 
individual’s utility when he does not feel accepted in society). 
 146. See Figure 2. 
 147. See supra Part III. 
 148. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 115, at 279. 
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Loss aversion has an effect when a right is withdrawn. In Figure 
6, utility is now at C’. Rational economics dictates that utility would 
fall by the same amount by which it increased, thereby falling by B’ 
back to A. Still, the withdrawal of a right would likely code as a loss 
and implicate the endowment effect. Withdrawal of the right to same-
sex marriage would certainly code as a loss for its supporters.149 
Therefore, as shown in Figure 7, a loss of objective value B would  
 
 149. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.  
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decrease the subjective value by B’’ > B’. As shown in Figure 6, the 
individual’s stock of entitlements would fall by B’’, causing his utility 
to fall from C’ to D < A. Whether the final value is compared to a 
person’s initial, pre-same-sex-marriage utility or to his utility after the 
right to same-sex marriage was granted, his utility has fallen. 
Granting the right to same-sex marriage would increase 
supporters’ stock of goods and services by B’, as shown in Figure 4. 
As shown in Figure 6, because B’ < B’’,150 overall utility is less than C’ 
but greater than A and D. Therefore, although the individual has the 
same entitlements as immediately after the right to same-sex marriage 
was granted, his overall utility is lower from losing the right and 
gaining it back. 
2. The Effect on Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage.  These 
findings do not entail a net societal utility loss because not everyone 
reacts the same way to the same events. For opponents of same-sex 
marriage, granting the right to same-sex marriage would likely code 
as a loss, and reinstating the traditional definition of marriage would 
code as a gain. 
The endowment effect would, as with supporters of same-sex 
marriage, change the analysis. The value function for opponents of 
same-sex marriage is shown in Figure 8. For those opponents, 
granting the right to same-sex marriage would likely code as a loss.  
 
 150. See Figure 6. 
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Under the rational-economic analysis, opponents of same-sex 
marriage would be returned to their initial level of utility151 and, as 
shown in Figure 9, utility would fall from E to G’ < G. When a stay is 
issued and same-sex marriage again becomes illegal, Figure 9 shows 
that the resulting gain of F’’ < F’ would be smaller than the loss 
experienced due to the initial granting of the right to same-sex 
marriage. Opponents’ utility would increase from G’ to H < E. 
Therefore, both proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage will 
have lost utility before the reinstatement of same-sex marriage. 
Because losses are felt more heavily than gains, once a person 
loses something he values, merely returning it cannot restore him to 
his former level of utility. Once opponents of same-sex marriage lost 
what they viewed as a right to the traditional definition of marriage, 
reinstating that right was not enough to put them back in the same 
place. Granting same-sex marriages would, as before, code as a loss, 
causing utility to fall by F’ from H to below G’. 
 
 151. Cf. Figure 3.  
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3. Underlying Assumptions of the Analysis.  The above analysis 
relies on three key assumptions. First, it assumes that all individuals 
within a group have the same value and utility functions. This is a 
simplifying assumption and is common in economic analysis even 
though it may not accurately reflect reality. It is well known that some 
people value certain rights more than others, particularly when the 
rights have such a large effect on a subgroup of the total population. 
Second, this analysis assumes that the objective value of each 
group member’s definition of marriage is the same. It is certainly 
possible that this objective value might be significantly higher for one 
side than for the other. For example, if proponents value the right to 
same-sex marriage more highly than opponents value the traditional 
definition of marriage, then banning same-sex marriage will not 
necessarily increase societal utility even if a larger percentage of the 
population opposes same-sex marriage. The endowment effect and 
loss aversion would still apply, but in a state that constitutionally 
prohibits same-sex marriage, the vote might be closely split. In 
California, for example, same-sex marriage was outlawed with 52.3 
percent of the vote; the 47.7 percent who voted against Proposition 8 
could have lost something of such great value, and felt that loss to 
such a high degree, that Proposition 8’s passage resulted in a net loss 
to society, in this case, the state of California. 152 The percentage 
approval alone, therefore, may not be the best indication of what 
maximizes societal utility. If the value to proponents of same-sex 
marriage were high enough, even an 80 percent vote against same-sex 
marriage may not mean that societal utility increased as a result. 
Third, this analysis assumes that all people have the same value 
function regardless of which group they are in and that the gain or 
loss of each person’s definition of marriage has the same objective 
value. In addition, the above analysis has not taken into account that 
these value functions could have different shapes across groups. If 
supporters of same-sex marriage had significantly steeper value 
functions, a loss or gain of the same objective magnitude as an 





 152. DEBRA BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION 7 
(2008). 
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utility. The effects of this assumption are shown in Figure 10. The 
original value function V is shown in gray. A steeper value function 
V’ is shown in black. An individual with value function V’ would feel 
both gains and losses more severely than an individual with value 
function V. 
Therefore, if supporters of same-sex marriage had a value 
function of V’ while opponents had a value function of V, supporters 
would feel the loss of same-sex-marriage rights much more strongly 
than opponents would feel the loss of their preferred definition of 
marriage and would feel the gain much more strongly if same-sex 
marriage were then reinstated. Thus, even with the same objective 
value on each side of the debate, a majority vote does not necessarily 
mean that societal utility has increased. If supporters’ value function 
V’ is sufficiently steeper than opponents’, a win for opponents with 
just over 52 percent of the vote would not lead to an increase in 
utility. The gain felt by opponents of same-sex marriage, even as a 
majority, would not be enough to offset supporters’ loss. Again, this 
could result in a net societal loss even if the majority has experienced 
a gain. On the other hand, if the gain to opponents of same-sex 
marriage were large enough, the loss to supporters would be 
overcome. 
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C. Societal Implications of a Behavioral-Economic Analysis 
This analysis has at least two implications. First, the repeated 
switching of a right from one side to the other results in a net loss to 
society, regardless of which side is correct from a policy perspective. 
Each time a right is taken away and then returned, an individual has 
lost utility. The same is true if a right is gained and then lost. 
Therefore, regardless of the initial entitlements or what proportion of 
people fall into each category, the act of switching a right from one 
side to the other and back causes a loss to society. This is most easily 
seen in Figure 9; each iteration of granting and then withdrawing a 
right caused utility to fall by the amount corresponding to the 
difference between F’ and F’’.153 
Second, each change’s ultimate effect on societal utility is unclear 
and would depend on a number of variables and unpredictable 
second-order effects,154 including the relative number of proponents 
and opponents of same-sex marriage, how strongly their convictions 
were held, and how pronounced the endowment effect was in each 
case. Calculating the overall societal effects of the withdrawal of a 
right would be a complex endeavor, one that judges should certainly 
not wade into. 
In the same-sex-marriage context, there is an added element of 
complexity. Both sides view themselves as possessors of a right, which 
will not be true in all individual-rights cases. If only one side sees 
itself as possessing a right, the effects on society of each change will 
be lessened. Once each side has been granted its definition of 
marriage, changing that definition codes as a loss. Though repeated 
switching would surely lead to an overall societal loss, it is unclear 
what overall effect the first shock to the system, granting the right to 
same-sex marriage (a gain for supporters and a loss for opponents) 
would have on society. The percentage of the population on either 
side of an issue is not necessarily the best indicator of societal 
utility.155 Typically, a couple’s decision to marry is not so time-
sensitive that a stay pending an appeal will prevent them from ever 
 
 153. The same is true if the right is taken away and then reinstated. The order of the 
changes does not matter in this context.  
 154. For example, one such variable would be a federal constitutional amendment banning 
same-sex marriage. 
 155. See supra text accompanying note 152. 
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marrying; moreover, any injury that the stay causes can be fixed 
through a final ruling from the court allowing the couple to marry.156 
The issue of what happens once a right is granted and then 
withdrawn is complicated. Fortunately, it is also easily avoidable. The 
Utah district court’s actions implicated the endowment effect because 
the court ignored it: had the court considered how temporarily 
allowing couples to marry might have affected the public interest, the 
balance of factors might have tipped the other way. A more effective 
approach in these cases would be that taken by lower courts following 
the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in Kitchen. For example, in De 
Leon v. Perry,157 the Western District of Texas held that Texas’s 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage could not 
withstand even rational-basis review.158 However, while the court 
struck down the amendment and granted a preliminary injunction, it 
also stayed its decision pending appeal to the Fifth Circuit.159 
Because the district court in Kitchen did not stay its decision for 
the inevitable appeal, it allowed same-sex marriages to be performed 
in Utah until the Supreme Court granted a stay. The district court’s 
refusal to stay its decision spawned a second lawsuit to clarify the 
validity of marriages performed before the Supreme Court’s stay 
went into effect.160 In De Leon, the state of Texas caught on to this 
issue, noting in its brief in opposition that “[a] preliminary injunction 
would . . . produce innumerable legal and practical problems.”161 The 
 
 156. There are certain situations in which a stay would so harm particular plaintiffs that it 
should not be granted. One such case arose out of Indiana: the Seventh Circuit ordered the state 
to recognize one same-sex marriage on an emergency basis because one of the partners was 
terminally ill. Order, Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th Cir. July 1, 2014); see also Baskin v. 
Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (granting a preliminary injunction upon 
finding irreparable harm because the plaintiff was rapidly approaching the average survival time 
for ovarian cancer). 
 157. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
 158. Id. at 662–63. The court sidestepped the issue of whether heightened scrutiny was 
warranted because it found that the amendment failed even rational-basis review. See id. at 652 
(“[T]he Court finds it is not necessary to apply heightened scrutiny to Plaintiffs’ equal 
protection claim since Texas’ ban on same-sex marriage fails even under the most deferential 
rational basis level of review.”). Instead, the court saw it as “[l]ikely [that] the Fifth Circuit, and 
eventually the United States Supreme Court, will weigh in on this issue with clear instructions.” 
Id. 
 159. Id. at 666. 
 160. Complaint at 2, Evans v. Utah, No. 2:14-cv-55 (D. Utah Jan. 21, 2014). 
 161. State Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 26, De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (No. 5:13-cv-982). 
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state favorably cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry v. Brown162 
to stay the district court’s injunction, claiming that “[t]he wisdom of 
these decisions is clear: because of the practical ramifications of 
temporary injunctive relief, a district court should not permit the 
commencement of same-sex marriages when reasonable doubt exists 
that the district court’s preliminary ruling will remain the law.”163 It is 
difficult to argue that these cases are clear-cut with little chance of 
reversal. The state also noted that the “[p]laintiffs do not even 
acknowledge, much less offer a solution to, this serious problem with 
their requested interim relief.”164 
Possibly, the plaintiffs did not offer a solution because the 
solution should have been obvious—stay the injunction until a final 
decision is rendered. The De Leon plaintiffs may have been correct 
that the same-sex-marriage ban caused them continuing irreparable 
harm that outweighed any potential harm the defendants could have 
suffered.165 However, failing to stay a preliminary injunction granting 
same-sex couples the right to marry disserves the public interest, 
which should weigh against granting an injunction. Irrespective of 
which side is “correct” or what level of scrutiny applies, the 
endowment effect and loss aversion demonstrate that switching back 
and forth between legal regimes disserves the public interest by 
reducing overall utility. These behavioral-economic concepts 
therefore weigh in favor of maintaining the status quo until litigation 
has concluded. 
Consideration of the behavioral-economic effects would not be 
dispositive in every case. Rather, it would bear on the analysis of only 
one of the four factors: whether preliminary relief would disserve the 
public interest. Depending on which formulation of the Winter test166 a 
court uses, consideration of loss aversion and the endowment effect 
could change its decision. Under the sliding-scale approach,167 the 
probability of reversal would also enter into the analysis of whether a 
 
 162. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 163. State Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction, supra note 161, at 27–28. 
 164. Id. at 28. 
 165. See Plaintiffs’ Opposed Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Defendants from 
Enforcing Texas’ Same-Sex Marriage Ban at 47, De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (No. 5:13-cv-982) 
(arguing this point). 
 166. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 167. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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stay or preliminary injunction would disserve the public interest: if 
reversal is highly likely, it is also more likely that loss aversion and the 
endowment effect will inflict greater societal losses. Additionally, in 
individual-rights cases, lower probabilities of reversal may still be 
enough to cause the public-interest factor to weigh strongly in one 
direction or the other—people value their rights highly, and they 
could experience significant losses when those rights are withdrawn.168 
Under the strict formulation of the Winter test,169 in which each factor 
must be proven by a preponderance, behavioral-economic 
considerations would almost certainly have an effect on the legal 
outcome. Therefore, depending on the weight given to this analysis, a 
court might be persuaded that a preliminary injunction or stay would 
disserve the public interest.170 
The district courts are already recognizing that the Supreme 
Court’s issuance of a stay in Kitchen171 indicates a preference for 
waiting for a final decision.172 Unfortunately, the Court’s short order 
failed to give lower courts any reasoned guidance. Subsequently, the 
Court declined to issue stays in same-sex-marriage cases only when a 
state refused to defend its law and no one would have standing to do 
 
 168. This translates to a steeper value function. See Figure 10. 
 169. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 170. This would affect only temporary relief because in the case of a final, permanent 
injunction there is not the same risk that the district court causes a societal loss.   
 171. Order in Pending Case, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (No. 13A687). 
 172. See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“In accordance 
with the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in Herbert v. Kitchen, and consistent with the 
reasoning provided in Bishop and Bostic, this Court stays execution of this preliminary 
injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.” 
(citations omitted)); Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) 
(“In accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in a nearly identical case on 
appeal from the District Court of Utah to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court stays 
execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.” (citation omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, No. 14-136, 2014 WL 3854318 (Oct. 6, 2014)); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 
2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“In accordance with the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in 
Kitchen v. Herbert, and consistent with the reasoning provided in Bishop, this Court s[t]ays 
execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.”), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
No. 14-225, 2014 WL 4230092 (Oct. 6, 2014). In 2004, some members of the Tenth Circuit 
invoked behavioral-economic concepts in the context of granting a preliminary injunction. See 
O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1016–17 (10th Cir. 
2004) (en banc) (McConnell, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of maintaining the 
status quo based on loss aversion and the endowment effect), aff’d and remanded sub nom. 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  
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so.173 The apparent reason for the Court’s preference appeared to be 
stability—a concern that, as same-sex-marriage cases work their way 
through the courts, temporary relief might disserve the public 
interest.  
Later, however, the Supreme Court changed its tune following 
the decision to grant certiorari in several same-sex-marriage cases.174 
When considering the same-sex-marriage case arising out of 
Alabama, only two members of the Court were in favor of a stay.175 
The situation in Alabama has been particularly acrimonious. 
Following the federal district court’s ruling that the state’s ban on 
same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due 
Process Clause,176 the chief justice of the state supreme court issued an 
order to state probate judges instructing them not to adhere to the 
federal district court’s ruling.177 Initially, most counties refused to 
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, but the majority have 
since begun issuing the licenses.178 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, saw granting a stay as 
“reflect[ing] the appropriate respect [the Court] owe[s] to States as 
sovereigns and to the people of those States who approved those 
laws.”179 He lamented the Court’s denial of the stay “without making 
any effort to preserve the status quo pending the Court’s resolution of 
a constitutional question . . . .”180 In a situation where the Court “will 
resolve the issue at hand in several months,”181 the two Justices were 
in favor of maintaining the status quo until a final resolution of the 
issue. 
Justice Thomas stated that he “would have shown the people of 
Alabama the respect they deserve and preserved the status quo while 
 
 173. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (holding that private parties do 
not have standing to take over the defense of a same-sex-marriage law from the state). 
 174. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650, at *1 (Jan. 16, 2015). 
 175. Strange v. Searcy, No. 14A840, 2015 WL 505563, at *1 (Feb. 9, 2015). 
 176. Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328728, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015). 
 177. Roy S. Moore, State of Alabama—Judicial System: Administrative Order of the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court (Feb. 8, 2015), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/CJ-Moore-legal-memo-2-8-14.pdf. 
 178. Sandhya Somashekhar, A Majority of Alabama Counties Are Now Issuing Same Sex 
Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/02/13/a-majority-of-alabama-counties-are-now-issuing-same-sex-marriage-
licenses. 
 179. Strange, 2015 WL 505563, at *1. 
 180. Id. at *2. 
 181. Id. 
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the Court resolves this important constitutional question.”182 In this 
case, Justice Thomas framed the status quo as the state of Alabama 
being able to enforce its law until a final determination on the 
constitutional question by the Supreme Court. As this example 
shows, when considering behavioral-economic effects, the public-
interest prong of the test weighs in favor of maintaining the status quo 
until a final decision is rendered. 
V.  ANOTHER APPLICATION: ABORTION RESTRICTIONS 
Staying an injunction is not what is truly at issue here—
endowment-effect analysis suggests that maintaining the status quo is, 
in many cases, preferable until a final decision is rendered.183 This 
concept applies more broadly than in the same-sex-marriage realm 
alone. This issue arises most prominently in individual-rights cases in 
which people’s fundamental rights are at issue.184 In the same-sex-
marriage context, if a district court grants an injunction requiring the 
state to issue same-sex-marriage licenses, it should also stay its ruling 
pending appeal, maintaining the status quo and preventing a societal 
utility loss that would otherwise result. 
In O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft,185 
some members of the Tenth Circuit recognized that behavioral-
economic effects, specifically the endowment effect, should inform 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Naturally, explicit consideration of the status quo would generate argument over what, 
precisely, the status quo is. Compare Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health 
Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506, 509 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (framing the status quo as the 
legal landscape before the enactment of new abortion restrictions), with id. at 507 (majority 
opinion) (framing the status quo as democratically elected officials’ ability to enact laws of their 
choosing). The proper formulation of the status quo is the last actual, peaceable, noncontested 
status that preceded the pending controversy. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 2948. The 
last peaceable moment will typically be the world just before the event that led to the lawsuit. In 
the context of conferring the right to same-sex-marriage, the last peaceable moment would be a 
world without same-sex marriage. In the case of a law restricting access to abortion, it would be 
a world without that law. 
 184. A similar logic would apply in other individual-rights contexts as well. For instance, in 
the voting-rights context, restricting access to voting due to a potentially unconstitutional law 
would weigh in favor of granting the injunction because it disserves the public interest. 
Similarly, in the Eighth Amendment arena, the fact that dangerous prisoners might need to be 
commingled while an appeal was pending could persuade a court to stay its decision until a final 
judgment is rendered. 
 185. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 
2004) (en banc), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao 
Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
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the legal analysis of injunctions. With respect to the issuance of 
preliminary injunctions, the concurrence noted that 
adverse disruptions in the status quo carry along with them the cost 
and difficulty associated with adjusting to change. These involve not 
only direct transition costs but also the costs associated with 
uncertainty, which manifest themselves in a reluctance to invest 
human or other capital in an enterprise where the returns could 
disappear at the drop of a judicial hat. Disruption is expensive. 
When a court requires a change in the status quo only to find that its 
grant of preliminary relief was mistaken and must be undone, the 
process is twice as disruptive as when the court preserves the status 
quo on a preliminary basis and later issues a final judgment 
requiring the change.186 
The concurrence properly considered a preliminary injunction’s 
effect on the status quo, but could have couched it more obviously in 
behavioral-economic principles. “Fundamentally, the reluctance to 
disturb the status quo prior to trial on the merits is an expression of 
judicial humility.”187 Not only does “a court bear[] more direct moral 
responsibility for harms that result from its intervention than from its 
nonintervention, and more direct responsibility when it intervenes to 
change the status quo than when it intervenes to preserve it,” but also 
“like the doctrine of stare decisis, preserving the status quo serves to 
protect the settled expectations of the parties.”188 
The logic of the O Centro concurrence has since received 
attention;189 the Tenth Circuit, even after Winter, applies a heightened 
burden of proof if an injunction would alter the status quo.190 In 
determining whether to grant preliminary relief, the proper approach 
would be to use the existing four-factor framework to consider the 
effect of any change in the status quo on the public interest. Rather 
than applying a heightened burden for status-quo-altering stays and 
preliminary injunctions, that alteration of the status quo can weigh 
against issuing an injunction because it disserves the public interest. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly considered the status quo in 
 
 186. Id. at 1016–17 (McConnell, J., concurring). 
 187. Id. at 1015. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 14, at 1029–30 (discussing the case). 
 190. See, e.g., Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (D. Colo. 2012) (“If the 
injunction will . . . alter the status quo . . . the movant must meet a heightened burden.” (citing 
O Centro, 389 F.3d at 975, aff’d, 542 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2013))). 
NEWMAN IN FR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/26/2015  12:51 AM 
1210 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1173 
deciding whether to grant a stay in another context: abortion 
restrictions. 
The Western District of Texas considered a state law requiring 
abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 
thirty miles of their clinics.191 The district court held that, although the 
state had a legitimate interest in promoting the health of both the 
mother and the fetus, the admitting-privileges provision bore no 
rational relationship to that interest.192 The court did not stay its 
decision.193 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit granted a stay.194 The Supreme 
Court denied a motion to vacate the stay in a divided order.195 The 
Fifth Circuit has since reversed the district court’s decision.196 Based 
on the above analysis, it is tempting to say that the stay was rightly 
granted, as it allowed the status quo to continue as usual until the 
final disposition of the case. That conclusion would, however, ignore 
the realities of the situation. As Justice Breyer noted in dissent, 
“under the status quo that existed in Texas prior to the enactment of 
the admitting privileges requirement, women across the State of 
Texas who needed abortions had a certain level of access to clinics 
that would provide them.”197 In other words, at the last peaceable 
moment198 women in Texas enjoyed a right of access to the clinics, one 
on which they certainly placed some value. “If allowed to stand, the 
District Court’s injunction would maintain that status quo pending 
the decision of th[e] case by the Court of Appeals.”199 
The Fifth Circuit should not have granted the stay. By doing so, 
the court effectively closed abortion clinics across the state when the 
only existing ruling was the district court’s, which found that there 
 
 191. The law required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges 
at a hospital that provides obstetrical or gynecological healthcare services within thirty miles of 
the place where the abortion took place. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031 (West 
2014). 
 192. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 
891, 909 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g denied, 769 F.3d 330 
(5th Cir. 2014). 
 193. See id. (granting the injunction with no mention of a stay). 
 194. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., 734 F.3d at 419. 
 195. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506, 
506–07 (2013). 
 196. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., 748 F.3d at 605. 
 197. On Emergency Application to Vacate Stay at 3, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. 
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 506, 509 (2013) (No. 13A452) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 198. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 2948. 
 199. On Emergency Application to Vacate Stay, supra note 197, at 3. 
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was no rational basis for the law.200 If the district court’s decision had 
instead been affirmed, the clinics would not have magically 
reopened—the stay would have changed the legal landscape in Texas. 
The proper response would have been to allow the clinics to 
continue to operate normally. Closing the clinics due to a law that is 
ultimately held to be unconstitutional would certainly weigh in favor 
of the stay disserving the public interest. Declining to issue stays in 
such circumstances would prevent the confusion and uncertainty that 
result from granting and then withdrawing rights. This approach 
would not implicate the loss-aversion consequences identified above. 
Instead, society would remain at the status quo until a final judgment 
was issued. By either not allowing a ruling to change the law or not 
allowing a potentially unconstitutional law to take effect—and 
therefore administering only one shock to the legal system—courts 
can prevent the overall societal loss that happens when a legal right is 
granted and then taken away. 
As the Seventh Circuit put it in its opinion refusing to issue a stay 
in a similar situation, “It is beyond dispute that the plaintiffs face 
greater harm irreparable by the entry of a final judgment in their 
favor than the irreparable harm that the state faces if the 
implementation of its statute is delayed.”201 This observation affects 
whether a stay would disserve the public interest—the public interest 
will always be broader than simply what the state wants, although the 
state’s desires are relevant. Because of the nature of the right being 
taken away, “delay in obtaining an abortion can result in the 
progression of a pregnancy to a stage at which an abortion would be 
less safe, and eventually illegal.”202 Because “[t]he state . . . made no 
attempt to show an offsetting harm from a delay of a few months in 
the implementation of its new law (should it be upheld after trial),”203 
the Seventh Circuit rightly declined to grant a stay. 
 
 200. At the time of the case, there were thirty-six abortion clinics in Texas, at least a third of 
which had to close as a result of the new restrictions. See Emergency Application to Vacate Stay 
at 7, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., 134 S. Ct. 506 (No. 13A452).  
 201. Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2841 (2014). 
 202. Id. at 796. 
 203. Id. at 797. 
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CONCLUSION 
Due to the endowment effect and loss aversion, losing something 
elicits a stronger reaction than gaining it. Courts should explicitly 
consider this phenomenon under the not-disserving-the-public-
interest prong in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction 
or stay a grant of an injunction pending appeal in cases involving 
individual-rights issues like same-sex marriage. Temporary and 
permanent relief affect the public interest differently because of the 
likelihood that the judgment will change. Each reversal of a change in 
who possesses a right disserves the public interest because people do 
not value their rights at the rights’ objective worth. Although this may 
not comport with the assumption of the rational-economic actor, 
courts should consider people’s different reactions to losses and gains 
in deciding whether to grant temporary relief. 
 
